

A study about the universals in *Ideas* / Um estudo sobre os universais em *Ideias* /

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RESUMO

A questão dos universais permanece tema na filosofia tanto na ontologia como na epistemologia. Em Husserl, há universais particulares, o 'X' noemático, o idêntico, e universais *stricto sensu*, nomes universais atemporais. Neste artigo, apresento o tema conforme analisado por Husserl em *Ideias I*. Na primeira seção, descrevo a trajetória até os universais destacando o paralelismo entre noese e noema. Na segunda seção, traço o reflexo para a filosofia da linguagem também afetada pela correspondência noético-noemática. Na terceira e última seção, mostro como a investigação sobre os universais move-se apenas na esfera noemática, e concluo defendendo a possibilidade de partindo do 'X' noemático alcançar o universal em sentido estrito.

PALAVRAS CHAVE Husserl, fenomenologia, *Ideias*, universais.

ABSTRACT

The problem of universals remains a philosophical theme not only in ontology but also in epistemology. In Husserl, there are particular universals, the noematic 'X', the identical, and universals *stricto sensu*, atemporal universal names. In this paper, I present the theme as it is analyzed by Husserl in *Ideas I*. In the first section, I describe the trajectory to the universals highlighting the parallelism between noese and noema. In the second section, I draw the reflection of this problem on the philosophy of language which is also affected by the noetic-noematic correspondence. In the third and last section, I show how the investigation about the universals moves in the noematic sphere, and conclude defending the possibility of reaching the universal strict sense departing from the noematic 'X'.

KEYWORDS

Husserl; phenomenology; *Ideas*; universals.

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INTRODUÇÃO

This paper is a study about the universals in *Ideias I*. The term, in German, is 'Allgemeinheit' and has been translated to 'universality' in the English edition of F. Kersten and in the Spanish edition of J. Gaos. In the Brazilian-Portuguese edition of M. Suzuki it has been translated to 'generalization'. I use the English translation considering it more accurate to the meaning given by Husserl and I hope that at the end of this paper the reason for this option is clearer.

Initially, I will highlight a few relevant concepts, the eidetic parallelism between noetic and noematic, the path to §124 entitled 'The Noetic-Noematic Stratum of "Logos", and 'Signifying and Signification', where Husserl presents different definitions of universality. From this point, I will focus the study on the idea of universals as "universals names", to wit, universals *stricto sensu*. In the next section, I will emphasize how the parallelism between noetic and noematic also echos in language and show a few difficulties and possibilities for reaching the universals and their signification. In the third and last section, I will explain how the path to the universals is given in the noematic sphere and how through the

universal given in the lived event, the noematic 'X', it is possible to raise consciousness to the universal *stricto sensu*.

1. TO THE UNIVERSALS

Husserl defines phenomenology as a descriptive science (§71), therefore establishes its object of knowledge and method. The objects of its knowledge are the essences of mental processes [die Erlebnisse] ³. The method is neither that of the natural sciences nor that of other eidetic descriptive sciences, such as

³ TRANSLATION NOTE: I would not translate 'die Erlebnisse' to 'mental processes'. Das Erlebnis is a remarkable event that someone has experienced, or has lived. It refers to the whole experience of living a specific event. When you translate to 'mental processes', it seems that the emphasis is on the consciousness acts (noese), but 'das Erlebnis' is not only about them, it is also about the content of these acts (noema), and more, is about the eidetic relation between them (the noetic-noematic relation). Therefore, I think the Brazilian-Portuguese translation is better; it is translated to 'lived' (vivido) to indicate an event experienced or lived, in shorten, a 'lived event' that now is under focus.

geometry (§§72-74). The phenomenological method is unique and through reduction (§76) unveils the realm of transcendental consciousness as primal category of “absolute” being. In turn, the doctrine of categories must set off from this radical ontological specificity, the distinction between consciousness and transcendent, transcendental and transcendent.

From this distinction the phenomenological reflection moves entirely in the transcendental dimension through acts of reflection (§77). The object, or the content, of these acts of reflection is any mental process, or considering our translation, any lived event⁴. When the lived event is noticed, when a reflection is directed to it, it becomes an object to the Ego, to the phenomenologist (§78).

The interest of the phenomenologist is about a very specific part of the lived event⁵, its essence. This part is only revealed when the phenomenological reduction is applied, and the findings bracketed become outstanding examples of universality of essences. The path is as follows: at first sight,

there is the non-reflecting lived event; then there is a modification of consciousness, one becomes aware of the lived event and starts to reflect on it; the lived event becomes, then, a reflected lived event. There are various reflection acts that cross a lived event, the immanent eidetic seizing, the immanent experiencing, the remembrance of something that has been perceived, or the expectation of something that will become perceived. These modifications belong to each lived event as possible ideal variations, ideal operations, reiterable modifications *ad infinitum*. Conversely, only through reflexive acts of experience, can we learn something about the continuously flowing and the necessary reference to the Ego, one and the same self, precisely because one can “look” at the whole flowing of lived events (§§78-80).

This flowing of lived events that belongs to an Ego reveals a continuous and endless temporality. This complex of lived events is given in this temporality, before, after and simultaneously, in a continuous progression of apprehensions, one after another, and the Ego is given absolutely and undoubtedly as an idea, in the Kantian sense (§§81-83).

The lived event given to a *pure I* is composed of a noetic dimension, consciousness acts, and a noematic dimension, the content of these acts.

⁴ See note #1.

⁵ From now on, I will adopt the Brazilian-portuguese translation. ‘Das Erlebnis’ is translated to ‘the lived event’. See note #1.

Thus, there is a perceiving act and the perceived as such; a remembering act and the remembered as such; the judging act and the judged as such. Put another way, the lived event is composed of intentionality, consciousness acts, the noetic, and what is intentioned, the correspondent content of these acts, the noematic. These contents can be understood as real components of lived events or non-real - ideal - components of lived events, which can be called sense (§§88-89).

The sense is immanently in the lived event of perceiving, of remembering and of judging, this is the idea that phenomenology intends to reach and describe. To describe an idea is not to describe thought, but to describe an essence, an *eidōs*. The core of the description is the eidetic as given, to describe the perception in its noematic perspective. In other words, the focus is not on the consciousness acts as in *Logical Investigations*. In *Ideas I*, what we are trying to describe are the core of the contents, the essences. In Husserl's words:

Everything which is purely immanent and reduced in the way peculiar to the mental process, everything which cannot be conceived apart from it just as it is in itself, and which *eo ipso* passes over into the Eidos in the eidetic

attitude, is separated by an abyss from all of Nature and physics and no less from all psychology - and even this image, as naturalistic, is not strong enough to indicate the difference. (HUA 3, 184).

Therefore, all intentionally lived events have intentional objects, namely, their objective sense (§90-91). The difficulty is in maintaining attention on the parenthesized effective object given in the lived event and not allowing consciousness to divert to the real object, to the thing outside. This is because, although phenomenology admits the existence of real and transcendent things, it takes them as components of the phenomenon, as elements contained in the reduced phenomenon, not as objects of knowledge. (Drummond, 1945, p.229)

Even if there are attentional changes and it is possible to privilege different aspects of the lived event, the noematic core remains identical (§92). It is also possible to admit changes on the noema, since different modes of alteration to the lived event are possible. Although, in the full noema, the manifold modes gather in a central core, "meant Objectivity as Objectivity". All these changes are possible because, despite the fact that the attentional modes are subjective, the object struck by an Ego-ray is independent, given only to the Ego,

but it is not “subjective” (§93). Husserl asserts:

It is then a further undertaking of more precise phenomenological study to discover what is prescribed according to eidetic law precisely by species, and what is so prescribed by the differentiating particularities, for noemata of changing particularities of a fixed species (e.g., perception). But the restriction holds throughout: in the sphere of essences there is nothing accidental; everything is connected by eidetic relations, thus especially noesis and noema. (HUA 3, 193/194)

These attentional modes reach the noema and do not cause any alteration on the identical noematic core. Another way to put it is to say that the ray of attention does not separate from the self, it is and remains a ray of the Ego, and the “object” is reached, is target, given only in reference to the Ego, but it is not “subjective” (§92).

Thus, we can infer that on both lower-level noeses such as sensitive perceptions, and on higher-level noeses such as moral judgments, composition appears on the noematic as a central core, something made conscious, as, under the designation of sense. A phenomenological study aims to demonstrate in such species of noema what is required by the

species itself and what is required by the particularities of a fixed species. This is because, in the sphere of essences, in the study of the central core of noema, there is no contingency, it being necessary to differentiate what is required by the species from what is demanded by the particularization (§93).

In other words, in apperceiving the lived event, reduction reveals the relation between real – hyletic and noetic – and non-real or ideal – noematic. In the example offered by Husserl, a sensory lived event, the sensitive perception of a tree is given: on one side, there is the actual unity of the lived, the color of the trunk of the tree, color as sensitive stimulus, sensation of color; on the other, there is the unity of the noema, the continuous unity of a variable perceptual consciousness, the same identical color in itself immutable. The real unity of the lived event is composed of hyletic and noetic elements; it is the unity that reveals the individual as the same, material, concrete, which allows me to say “I see the same tree”. The unity of the ideal is the unity of the noema which reveals the post-reduction essence (§97).

There is also a third unity, the noetic-noematic unity, which binds that object to a certain essence. In the post-reduction mode, the *eidós* of the noema points to the *eidós* of the noetic

consciousness, that is, they are eidetically interdependent, although they are independent.

An issue arises: since noematic "objects" are evidently units brought to consciousness in the lived event, but transcendent in relation to it, how can we elucidate the relation between the real composition of the lived event and what is in consciousness as ideal, as essence? (§102)

The intentional object as such appears as support to all noematic characters. All noematic characters suggested have a universal phenomenological scope, they constitute the necessary foundations of all intentional lived events, the same fundamental genera and species of characteristics are also found among all these founded lived events, and therefore, in general, in all these intentional lived events.

Corresponding to the noematic characters, also called modes of being, there are noetic characters (§103), for example, certainty corresponds to perceptual belief, possible to assumption, plausible to conjecture, problematic to questioning, doubtful to doubt, denial to rejection, affirmation to assent (§§103-108). Aside from the modifications related to the sphere of belief, there is a consciousness mode entirely particular, neutrality (§109). Neutrality is a modification in the

sphere of belief that does not operate, does not scratch, does not emphasize, it refrains from operating, abstains from producing, puts out of action, parenthesizes, leaves undecided. The character of position is in suspense. Belief, conjecture, denial, and other noetic characters are neutralized and the correlates are for consciousness, not in the actual mode, but "mere thinking of".

Neutrality and positing are opposing attitudes, yet complementary (§110). They are opposing attitudes because positing is positional, evaluates with reason, may be correct or not; neutrality or suspension is not positional, cannot be evaluated with reason, cannot be neither correct nor incorrect. In addition, various positions potentially included in it can be taken from effective consciousness, effective positions; on the other hand, neutral consciousness does not contain any "real" predicate. They are complementary because all lived events ideally correspond to a neutralization mode. Hence, there are two fundamental possibilities of realizing consciousness within the cogito: the effective, positional, authentic cogito, and the shadow, non-effective, non-positional, inauthentic cogito. It happens that the effective operation and the neutral modification correspond and yet they

do not share the same essence because when positional actuality is neutralized it becomes potentiality (§§113-114). Put another way, all perception has its background of perception and this is a unit of potential positions. The background leads to perspective changes and potential "seizures". Or else, in the essence of all lived events is outlined beforehand a set of potential positions of being.

Hence it is possible to identify several intentional domains, one can differentiate incipient or non-effected acts from actual acts, among these there are neutrality and positionality, and among this there are actual and potential positions. And, even in the face of so many variables, the parallelism between noese and noema remains under all intentional domains (§115).

Up to this point, Husserl adopts examples of simple noeses, acts of perception. From then on, he turns his attention to noeses of feeling, of desiring, of willing (§§116-117). It may seem a deviation in reasoning, but it is within the framework of affective consciousness that Husserl makes an evident passage from particular to universal.

To these new noetic moments correspond a new dimension of sense, new noematic moments: values. Values are not determining parts of things, but values of things. That is to

say, in the affective consciousness, the higher level noema - value - is a core of sense surrounded by new posited characters. In other words, things have no value, but support value, and consciousness, in turn, consciousness is of possible value, or else, only things are supposed to be valuable. Thus, apprehensions of value relate to apprehensions of things in the same way that the new noematic characterizations (beauty and ugliness, goodness and badness) relate to modes of belief.

In affective consciousness, positional affective, contents correspond to acts, therefore, to acts of pleasure, desire, valuation, acts of will in general, correspond positional characters. To these positional characters lies an *archontic* positing that unifies in itself and governs all others, the supreme unity of species, the universality of essence. Thus the analogy between universal logic, universal theory of value, and ethics. These lead to the constitution of formal universal formal parallel: formal logic, formal axiology, and theory of practice.

This is only possible because every thesis is subject to an eidetic law: any thesis, of whatever species (including affective), can be transformed into an actual doxic position. Therefore, any proposition (including desire) can be transformed into a doxic proposition. It is as if in

all the positional characters (including valuations) doxic modalities were kept. Consequently, every act or every correlate of act takes on a logical aspect and can be explained logically thanks to the universality of essence. Otherwise, all acts in general (including acts of affection and will) are potentially objectifying.

A new question arises, how can we promote this unity once lived events and the acts of consciousness distend in time (§118)? These lived events and their acts must be unified in syntheses, synthesized by consciousness. Husserl identifies two types of synthesis, articulated synthesis and continuous synthesis. In articulated syntheses, acts are linked in an act of higher order. In continuous synthesis, unity belongs to the same level of ordination; there is no act of higher order unifying them.

Considering the articulated syntheses of lived events, the possibility is evident of transforming what one is aware of from many acts (polythetic) into something that one is simply conscious of because of a single act (nomothetic) (§119). Thus every noese contributes to the constitution of a total object, or else, every consciousness in synthetic unity has a total object. In a simpler way, a lived event is made up of

multiple acts and each act corresponds to a noema. To unify a lived event is to realize an articulated synthesis, to identify an act of higher order and its corresponding synthetic object, a total object. Or, to intuit a total object implies a specific act of consciousness, since the ideal unity of the object could not be intuited by a dispersed multiplicity of particular acts. (Moreland, 2001, p. 44)

A synthesis depends on the character of the noeses, if all subtheses are positional, it is positional; if one is neutral, it is neutral. Thus, from the positional noeses, an articulated synthesis is carried out step by step. Position, apposition, presupposition, postposition etc. compose an articulated synthesis. It must be remembered that these noeses are radiations of an Ego as a source of original productions (§122). It is an active Ego. Every thesis begins with a point of initiation (*fiat*), a first spontaneous act, for example, deciding or volunteering. Every act can begin in this mode of spontaneity, a creative act, in which the self makes its entrance as subject of spontaneity in a new flow of lived events.

This mode of initiation passes through an eidetic need, a modal change. This modal change does not imply losing all that has been previously apprehended, no synthetic

step is abandoned, but the mode of actuality essentially changes with a new actual thematic of origin. This is because to every actual noetic change corresponds a noematic change. However, despite the necessary changes of the noematic mode, the essence always remains the same.

Having established these premises, Husserl approaches the subject from another perspective, that of language.

1. UNIVERSALS AS THEME OF PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE AND ITS DIFFICULTIES

In dealing with affective consciousness, Husserl had already stated that any proposition could be transformed into a doxic proposition (§117). It is from this "translation" of non-doxic proposition into doxic proposition that one can explain the universality of predicative judgments and the necessity of formal and material noetic disciplines, or noematic and ontological (§118).

These disciplines are developed from the articulated syntheses that transform polythetical acts into nomothetical acts, such as, collecting, disjunctive, explicating and relating. The whole series of syntheses determine the formal-ontological forms according to the pure forms of

the synthetical objectivities being constituted in them and, with respect to the structure of noematic formation are mirrored in the apophantic significational forms belonging to formal logic. Simply put, the articulated syntheses bind acts in a unit and to the nomothetic act corresponds a total object. Therefore, to the formal-ontological forms - noetic structure - a noematic structure corresponds that, in turn, implies apophantic forms of signifying the formal logic. Put differently, every process of synthesis that affects the acts and their content, the noetic-noematic relationship, has a corresponding one in language, that is, in formal logic understood as apophantic, as propositional logic.

In logic, this correspondence is evident by the law of nominalization (§119) according to which every proposition and every partial form distinguishable in the proposition corresponds to a nominal character. Nominalization is the logical-formal counterpart of the transformation of a polythetical act into a nomothetic act so that this named unit can serve as the subject of an affirmation. Husserl gives as an example the judgment expressed in 'S is p' where 'S is p' can be transformed into the subject of an affirmation, "that 'S is p' is positive."

Husserl draws a parallelism between all the layers described so far and the layers of acts of expression,

logical in the apophantic sense, which are also affected by the relation between noese and noema. Hence the noetic-noematic relationship also has repercussions on expression and signification (§124).

This parallelism implies an amplification of the understanding about the act of signifying and signification. Before, they referred only to the linguistic sphere, the expression, but Husserl proposes its extension to be applied in every noetic-noematic sphere, whether intertwined with expressive acts or not.

The example is the following: we perceive an object already put nomothetically, "this is white". This process does not require expression; it is a perceptive act that does not depend on expression or verbalization. If, however, we verbalize, "this is white", then we have a new expressive layer superior to the noematic layer of "meant as meant". This process applies also to other acts such as remember and fantasize.

Thus, we have the following maxim: anything 'meant as meant' considered in the noematic sense of any act is expressible through logical significations. Quoting Husserl:

The verbal sound can only be called an expression because the signification belonging to it

expresses; expressing inheres in it originaliter. "Expression" is a distinctive form which allows for adapting to every "sense" (to the noematic "core") and raises it to the realm of "Logos", of the conceptual and, on that account, the "universal". [HUA 3, 257]

In the noetic dimension, expressing is an act to which all other acts must conform and combine so that all acts of noematic sense, and consequently the reference to objectivity, are conceptually stamped on the noematic correlate of the expression.

In short, on the lived event there is, on one side, a real dimension that includes the hyletic and the noetic, on other side, an ideal dimension, the noematic (§97). At first, we live the perception, 'this is white', 'this is a tree'. Then, we can verbalize this lived event. Remembering that the expressive act is also affected by the noetic-noematic relationship, it is easily understood that, in its noetic dimension, its expressive act combines several other acts, but with the same noematic signification.

This layer of expression produced from previous layers brings up some problems. Once all science is objectified through "logic" in the sense of apophantic, in the midst of expression, the problems of expression and signification are

immediately presented to the philosopher. Some difficulties are: how to understand the "expression" of the "expressed", how expressive lived events relate to non-expressive ones and what the intervention of the expression entails for the latter? What is the eidetic nexus between the layer of expressive signification and the layer of what is expressed?

Despite giving expression to all other intentionalities, the expressive layer is not productive, or its performance in noematic terms is exhausted in the expression and in the conceptual form. The expressive layer is, in essence, perfectly in accordance with the layer that receives the expression accepting the essence of this. For this reason it is called representation. In further words, the expression is a spiritual formation that exerts new intentional functions in the previous intentional layer and from it receives correspondingly intentional functions. This correspondence between the non-expressive layer and the expressive layer is such that when the non-expressive layer is positional or neutral, the expressive layer follows it entirely in its mode.

It is in this context that Husserl presents different definitions of universality [Allgemeinheit].

Of particular importance is the understanding of the different sorts

of "universality" which make their appearance there: on the one side, those which belong to each expression and moment of expression, also to the non-selfsufficient "is", "not", "and", "if", and so forth; on the other side, the universality of "universal names" such as "human being" in contrast to proper names such as "Bruno;" again, those which belong to an essence which, in itself, is syntactically formless in comparison to the different universalities of signification just touched upon. [HUA 3, 259]

In order to understand these different definitions one has to understand the different modes of actuality (§125), or different modalities of performing the act considering the layer of signification (logic) and the lower founding layer (the expressed). There are two possible levels of confusion: first, the relation between the expressive (logical) layer and the lower layer (the expressed), in this case the lower layer may be a confusing unit (and most often it is), or the adjustment between the layer of what is expressed and the layer of logical expression is not precise; secondly, the relation between the proposition expressed and the ones that follow, when the former ceases to be a theme and it is overcome by the following, for example, when we are reading,

we can articulate and freely effect each signification and synthetically connect significations.

The impact of these difficulties on the method of clarification is highly relevant, since the need to move from confused thinking to completely explicit knowledge and to clarified and distinctive acts of thinking is evident. That is to say, all logical acts (acts of signification) need to be converted into precise acts by establishing a full logical distinction. And, because of the correlation between the noetic and noematic dimension, something similar must also be operated in the founding lower layer, *"everywhere unliving is to be converted into the living, all confusion into distinctness, but also all non-intuitiveness into intuitiveness"*. [HUA 3, 260] Only when we perform this work "of conversion" made in the *abstractum*, does the method of clarification come into action.

Another difficulty level is the difference between the complete and incomplete expression (§126). There is a unity between what is expressed and what expresses; however, it explains that the upper layer that expresses does not have to extend through the entire layer of what is expressed. There does not need to be a perfect match between what is expressed and expression. The expression is complete if it marks all

the synthetic forms and materials of the lower layer, is incomplete if it only does it partially.

There is, however, an inevitable incompleteness that is part of the essence of expression as such, that is, of its universality. This implies that it is contained in the sense of universality, inherent to the essence of the expression, that all the particularities of the expressed can never be reflected in the expression. The expression layer is not a copy of the layer of what is expressed, not all dimensions of this layer are covered in the expression. Even in the particular sense of a term there remain essential differences as to how forms and synthetic materials find expression.

One more difficulty is the need to complement all significations, forms of signification and "syncategorematic" significations. The expressions alone are understandable, but still lack complement. The question is what does this need for complement of significations imply and how does it affect both layers.

For Husserl, all these points can be clarified if it is explained *"how statings as the expressions of judging are related to the expressing of other sorts of acts."* [HUA 3, 262]. There are proposition forms structured in a peculiar way, interrogative

propositions, presumption-propositions, optative propositions, imperative propositions, etc., but interpretable dubiously. Questions arise, do these expressions have a kind of signification of their own, or are they actually propositions of statements?

Thought over the theme considering only the noetic dimension is insufficient. It is necessary to consider the noematic dimension to which the acts of signification are directed. This, then, is the radical problem:

"Is the medium of expressive signifying, this appertinent medium of the Logos, a specifically doxic one? In the adaptation of the signifying to the signified, does it not coincide with doxic itself inherent in all positionality?" [HUA 3, 263]

A doxic expression, to be faithful and complete, to express straightforwardly a lived event, for example, affective, could only correspond to doxic lived events non-modalized, that is, could only express certainties. If I am not sure when I wish, then it is not correct if in direct adjustment I say, "May S be p." This is because expressing is not merely verbalizing, but signifying, a doxic act in strong sense that expresses a certainty of belief.

But, if modalities happen, "Maybe S can be p", then one can try to adjust the expression as much as possible. However, in this case there is a deviation. Such deviations are possible because several possibilities of explanation are the essence of all objectivity. The expression is not then adjusted to the original phenomenon, but directly to the predicative phenomenon derived from it.

Husserl makes one more warning; the eidetic clarification of the idea of doxa is not the same thing as clarification of statements or explanations.

2. FROM NOEMATIC 'X' TO THE UNIVERSALS

In the above quotation, Husserl presents different definitions of universal; the definition that we intend to deepen is the one of universals as "universal names". The investigation of the universals opens on both sides, noetic and noematic, but the search for universal names, strictly universal, occurs in the noematic dimension. This is because, to a large extent, what has been taken by analyzing the acts was entirely obtained by directing the gaze to the "meant as meant", and thus, it is intended to describe noematic structures. In other words, given eidetic parallelism between noesis and noema that permeates all modes

of consciousness; the investigation of universality of the noesis is only complete when accompanied by the search for the universality of the noema. The objective is to direct attention to the universal structure of the noema. The phenomenological problem of the reference of consciousness to objectivity has, first and foremost, its noematic side.

For Husserl, there is a universal noematic structure in which a certain noematic "core" separates from the mutable "characters" belonging to it (§129). The relation takes place in the following way: every noema has a content, that is, a signifying, and refers through it to "its" object. That is to say, an intentional lived event has "reference to the object," but it is also "consciousness of something." However, the reference to the object cannot be the same as the one desired when speaking of intentional reference, since each noetic moment corresponds to a moment of the noema. So, how to find "the same", the identity of the noema, its central point, or else, the support to noematic properties?

An "objectivity" is part of the noema, an essence that is immune to modifications (§130). The goal, therefore, is the description of the "object as intended", the "meant objective something, as it is meant", avoiding all "subjective" expressions.

In this description, formal-ontological expressions are used, such as "object", "determination", "state of affairs"; material-ontological expressions such as "physical thing", "bodily figure", "cause"; determinations such as "hard", "rough", "colored". All of them under inverted commas, accordingly the noematic-modified sense. Thus, through conceptual explanation and apprehension we obtain a closed set of formal or material predicates that determine the "content" of the objective core of the noema.

It is important, however, to point out that these predicates are predicates of 'something', an identical intentional object, a pure 'x', the central noematic moment, a single object, and such predicates are unthinkable without this support (§131). The predicates are oscillating and variable, but the central point of the intentional object is the same, nothing contingent. Hence the object is brought to consciousness as identical and yet in different noematic modes.

To each of the various noemas correspond acts with different nucleus, but in such a way that they come together in a unity of identity, in a unity in which the "something", the determinable that is contained in each nucleus, is brought to consciousness as identical. And, just as separate acts can come together in

a "concordant" unity; the "something" of the separate nucleus is brought to consciousness as being the same something, the same 'X', the same object.

Husserl, then, establishes a possible difference between this noematic core and sense. The intentional object receives two definitions, first, it is the pure point of unity, that noematic object purely and simply given; secondly, is the 'how' of its determinations, including its indeterminacy, is a noematic object in the 'how' of its modes of givenness (§132). Therefore, sense is a fundamental part of the noema, but it is not the core. Every sense has not only "its object", but different senses refer to the same object. Therefore, sense is not a concrete essence of the noema, but a kind of abstract form intrinsic to it.

However, there may be a coincidence between the sense and the core. Husserl refers to sense in fullness mode and the full core. If we detect the sense exactly with the content of determination in which it is aimed and if we abstract all the differences in the manner of being of the modes of effectuation, then we have access to a fullness of clarity. In this case, there would be a coincidence between the description of the full core and the description of the sense in its fullness mode.

Such a description occurs through the formulation of propositions, again the parallelism between noema and noese is present (§133). The "sense" corresponds to "matter" and the unity of sense andthetic character to the "proposition". There are propositions of a single member, as in perceptions, and of more than one member, synthetic propositions, such as predicative doxic (judgments). Propositions of pleasure, desire, command, etc. may be of one or more members. The task is, on the one hand, the search for a systematic and universal doctrine of the forms of the senses (significations), on the other, the systematic classification of propositions.

To delineate a systematic doctrine of sense-forms or logical significations, that is, of predicative propositions, of judgments, with a universal scope to mark all possible kinds of significations in all possible operations, is a capital task (§134). A true morphology would constitute the eidetic and necessary substrate for a scientific *mathesis universalis*, for a general morphology of the senses.

These synthetic forms belong to a strict formal system and can be extracted by abstraction and fixed in conceptual expression. To determine all these a priori forms and to dominate in systematic completeness the configurations of forms, which are

of an infinite diversity and yet circumscribed by laws, implies the idea of a morphology of propositions or apophatic syntaxes.

Husserl explains that positions can be doxic modalities, because when we conjecture or explain or affirm or deny, even assuming different forms ("S could be p", "Is S p?", "S is not p", "S is p", "S is certainly, effectively p"), what is "conjectured", or what is "problematic", or what is "asserted", or what is "denied" continue to have the noematic correlates of these different modes of expression. In other words, the form is multiply determined, however, there is a total proposition of which a total thesis is part, including in this a doxic thesis. That is why every proposition can be converted into a proposition of statement, in a proposition on the modality of the content. Once again the correspondence between the noetic and the noematic is present, between the proposition and the sense.

Thus every thing of nature is represented by all senses and propositions that are variably fulfilled, that is to say, it is represented by the multiplicities of "full cores", by all possible "subjective modes of appearance", in which it can be constituted noematically as something similar (§135). Put another

way, the unity of the thing contrasts with the multiplicity of noetic lived, all agreeing that they are aware of the identical 'X'.

Next, Husserl proposes the idea of constitution of an object. To constitute an object is to bring an object to evidence; an object is constituted in certain nexuses of consciousness evidencing a unity, the consciousness of an identical 'X'. It is in this context that one can ask about effectiveness: is the identity of the 'X' intentioned noematically "effective" identity? How can all those nexus of consciousness make an effective object? How does the noetic-noematic constitution of objectivities occur?

Here, we are under the jurisdiction of reason that asks about effectiveness, conjecture, doubt, and resolves the doubt. When one speaks of actual, truly existing objects of the category of being, the statement that describes it "will be true" or "will be effective" or "will be rationally attestable" if it is in correlation with it. This correlation is not empirical, but an "ideal" possibility, a possibility of essence. Simply put, what is being described is the object as pure X, the same, the identical, already reduced, object of articulated synthesis, the content of a nomothetic act. Therefore, the correspondence between the actual, existing object, category of being, and the founded

statement, evidenced immediately, is a possibility of essence.

To answer these questions about effectiveness, Husserl introduces a number of key interdependent concepts, they are: originarily presentive, "intuitive" mode, evidence, and belonging. A positional lived event is given in originarily presentive mode, for example, perceptive acts such as vision, or in non-originarily presentive mode such as remembering (§136). These differences, however, do not affect the pure sense of the proposition, for it is always identical and intuitive as such by consciousness. The difference is in how sense, or proposition, requires an addition of complementary moments, that is, how sense or proposition is filled or not filled. Husserl gives an example: we see a landscape or we remember a landscape. Considering the way of filling the sense, in the first case, we have the intuitive mode, when the sense of the "object as such" is brought to consciousness as an originarily presentive, "in person", and in the noema corporeity is merged into the pure sense. In the intuitive mode is a mode of living the sense in which the "object as such" is brought to consciousness in originarily presentiveness. The sense is fulfilled. In the second case, of remembering, we have the opposite, the consciousness of memory is not originarily presentive, the landscape

is not perceived as such, although it has its own legitimacy.

Husserl focuses on perception. To any appearing "in person" belongs a position. The position is motivated by the appearance, that is, the position has its originarily foundation of legitimation in the original data of the appearing. In just the same manner, the position of essence originally given in the seeing of essence belongs to the position-material, to the 'sense'. The position of essence is founded in the sense that in its turn is founded on the intuition of essence in original giving. So, consciousness is able to intuit the essence, the universal, from the experience, from the particular phenomenon. Universals are transcendent to consciousness although they are intuited and evidenced transcendently. (Sparrow, 2014, p. 29)

Make evident is to clarify the unity of a rational position with what motivates it, is the agreement between what is understood and the given (§§137-138). To evidence or intellectual seeing is a positional, doxic and adequately presentive consciousness. It is an act of reason. We have the evidence derived from the apodictic view, as in the case of arithmetic, where the data is adequate, an evidence of essence, and the evidence derived from experience as in the example above, seeing a

landscape, a weak evidence in which the data is inadequate, the appearance is incomplete, although the sense remains. In this case, the task of phenomenology is to bring to clarity how consciousness of inadequate data relates to a single and determinable 'X'.

A position has its legitimation as a position of its sense if it is rational and rational character is what corresponds to it by essence (§139). At the same time, a proposition has its legitimation when it is infused with the noematic character. Remembering that, considering only the doxical sphere, all doxic modalities (possible, believable, problematic, doubtful, etc.) refer to the original doxa, that is, they refer to an original rational character that forms part of the domain of the original belief that in turn refers to the original evidence. Simply put, all lines flow towards the original belief and its original reason, which is, the "truth". More than that, only the original evidence is an "original" source of legitimacy. Remembering and empathy, although motivated, are imperfect evidences that can lead to original evidence only in a mediate form. (§§140-141).

Husserl then presents his definition: *"Truth is manifestly the correlate of the perfect rational characteristics pertaining to protodoxa, to certainly of belief."* [HUA 3, 290].

Therefore, the sentences 'the proposition of doxa is true' and 'the perfect rational character conforms to the belief' are equivalent. To say that it is true implies admitting its rationality.

From eidetic understanding of truth it is possible to deduce an explanation of the eidetic correlation between the idea of true being and the idea of truth, between the "truly existent object" and the "object to be rationally put." To do so, the object would be given completely with respect to the determinable 'X', would leave nothing "open". This is because the rational thesis must have its basis in the original given in the full sense, the 'X' aimed at full determination and originality. Thus, in principle, every "truly existing" object corresponds to the idea of a possible consciousness, in which the object itself is originally apprehensible in perfect suitability.

The possibility of apprehending an object is eidetically prescribed by its category, whether perfect or imperfect, whether complete or incomplete, its possibility of complementation or fulfillment (§ 142). The category of the object prescribes the general rules of evidence for each particular object brought to consciousness in multiplicities of concrete lived events, prescribes the rules of how an object

can be brought to determinacy of its meaning and mode of giving. The determinations of the objects are given by apodictic evidence, is the case of space objects that are submitted to the forms of pure geometry. The geometry rule system determines all possible motion shapes, but does not trace any real singular stroke. The transcendent cannot give itself adequately, but the idea of something transcendent, its sense, its a priori rules, yes (§ 144).

In this sense, the natural sciences seek the determination of things as units put experimentally; phenomenology seeks in the interior of nature the univocal determination in accordance with the idea of natural object. Phenomenology is a new layer of research, noetic and noematic, which underpins natural sciences. Thus, we have the maxim: *“what takes place in the Eidos functions as an absolutely insurmountable norm of the fact.”* [HUA 3, 301]

What matters to phenomenology is to study the continuous unifications of identity in all domains, all studies in transcendental orientation. The configurations of noeses and noemas, systematic and eidetic morphologies, needs and possibilities of essence, forms of unification, eidetic relations and laws of essence, in short, the object of study is always the designation of eidetic nexus and the

first step is the noematic 'X'. The essences are conceived as ideal, independently existing, timeless universals that can be manifested in distinct space-time particulars (Smith and McIntyre, 1982, p. 117). For example, among the essences of the natural world we have 'thing', among the essences of the ideal world we have 'value' and among the essences of the formal world we have 'number', which phenomenology encompasses through eidetic laws and reaches from the bond with the noematic 'X'.

Therefore, the possibility of the noematic 'X' is not attested only by the originarily presentiveness, but also by the whole chain that starts from it, that is, the open access to different levels of universality that corroborate reciprocally and coherently. Though, from the universal given in the lived event, the noematic 'X', it is possible to trace all the way to the universal in the strict sense understood as abstract non-spatio-temporal property. This is the reason why I considered the translation of 'Allgemeinheit' to universality more accurate than to generality. A general idea is derived from a process of abstraction, admits exception. The universal as intended is the result of phenomenological reduction, admits no contingency, is an abstract property, neither temporal nor spacial, a universal in the strict

sense. This is the idea of universality presented by Husserl in *Ideas I*.

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