Prolegômenos:

da virada noética à primeira fenomenologia

Abstract

Our research, in three moments, aims to follow the noetic turn of logic from paragraph 67 of the Prolegomena when Husserl will seek to base the subjective structure and pure logic as a condition of possibility of knowledge and, thus, to separate the logical domains from the psychological domains of knowledge. In a second moment, we will try to elucidate how these demarcations are possible from logic, in view of the passage to the general subjective possibility of knowledge, which the philosopher named noetics. Finally, in paragraph 51, we will investigate the experiences as evidence of the truth in the very constitution of subjectivity and how Husserl will guide logical subjectivity in favor of the first phenomenology, rejecting with it all kinds of epistemological psychologism. All this will only make sense if a comparative analysis is made between the original text of 1900 and its second edition in 1913, suggesting with the latter a second phase of the master's thought.